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Abstract This paper investigates strategic monitor-
ing behavior within group lending. We show that
monitoring efforts of group members differ in
equilibrium due to the asymmetry between members
in terms of future profits. In particular, we show that
the entrepreneur with the highest future profits also
puts in the highest monitoring effort. Moreover,
monitoring efforts differ between group members due
to free-riding: one member reduces her level of
monitoring if the other increases her monitoring
effort. This effect is also at play when we introduce a
group leader into the model. The individual who
becomes the group leader supplies more monitoring
effort than in the benchmark case. We empirically
test the model using data from a survey of micro-
finance in Eritrea and show that the group leader
attaches more weight to future periods than nonleaders
in the group, which may explain why a large part of
total monitoring is done by the leader.
Keywords Group lending  Group leader 
Moral hazard  Monitoring
JEL Classifications D82  G29  L26  O16
1 Introduction
Lack of access to credit is generally seen as one of the
main reasons why many people in developing econ-
omies remain poor. Usually, the poor have no access to
loans from the banking system, because they cannot
put up acceptable collateral and/or because the costs
for banks of screening and monitoring the activities of
the poor, and of enforcing their contracts, are too high
to make lending to this group profitable. Since the late
1970s, however, the poor in developing economies
have increasingly gained access to small loans with
the help of so-called microfinance programmes.
Especially during the past 10 years, these programmes
have been introduced in many developing economies.
Between December 1997 and December 2005 the
number of microfinance institutions increased from
618 to 3,133. The number of people who received
credit from these institutions rose from 13.5 million to
113.3 million (84% of them being women) during the
same period (Daley-Harris 2006).
Many microfinance programs are characterized by
so-called joint liability. With joint liability lending the
group of borrowers is made responsible for the
repayment of the loan; if one group member does
not repay her loan, others may have to contribute so as
to ensure repayment. In many cases, groups are small,
consisting of 5–10 members. The broad consensus in
the economic literature is that it mitigates problems of
asymmetric information related to providing loans.
However, most theoretical models on joint liability
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lending take a rather simple approach as to how group
lending mitigates these problems. Basically, most
models assume that all members monitor each other
and that monitoring efforts of members are equal.
Usually, one of the members of the group is
appointed to become the group leader, a position for
which anyone from the group may volunteer. The
group leader may have different tasks and the exact
contents of these tasks may differ among group
lending programs. However, the group leader usually
is the intermediary between the group and the
program staff, who regularly reports to the program’s
staff on the performance and sustainability of the
group. Moreover, the group leader usually chairs
group meetings, collects the installment payments
from group members and transfers them to the credit
officer, visits group members regularly and discusses
business- and/or group-related problems, and calls for
extra group meetings if repayment problems occur.
Again, depending on the characteristics of the group
lending program, group leaders may or may not be
paid for their activities.
Existing literature has hardly dealt with the specific
role of the group leader as part of the group lending
mechanism. However, based upon the above descrip-
tion, it seems reasonable to assume that in most cases
the group leader plays a prominent role in the
functioning of the group. Many questions remain
unanswered, though, such as why someone wants to
become group leader, whether they contribute to
mitigating moral hazard behavior, and whether or not
they help improving the repayment performance of
groups. Whereas the latter two questions have been
addressed empirically in two recently published papers
(Hermes et al. 2005 and 2006), the first issue remains
unresolved. Given the fact that the activities of the
group leader are costly and assuming that she/he is not
financially paid for these activities, the question arises
why someone would volunteer to become group
leader. We present a theoretical model that explains
why this is the case. We also provide preliminary
evidence supporting the main outcomes of the theo-
retical model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 briefly describes the main characteristics of
existing models of joint liability lending. In Sects. 3–8
we provide a new theoretical framework analyzing
group interaction, particularly focusing on strategic
behavior of individual group members, as well as of
the group leader. Section 3 describes the basic model
for a group lending programme with three asymmetric
borrowers. In Sect. 4 we derive the condition stating
that moral hazard is present if there is no peer
monitoring. Section 5 presents the monitoring tech-
nology, for both the group leader and the other group
members. Section 6 discusses the benchmark case in
which there is no group leader. In Sect. 7, we
introduce a group leader and derive equilibrium
monitoring levels for the case in which the most
profitable entrepreneur is the leader, as well as for the
case in which the second most profitable individual
becomes the group leader. Section 8 endogenizes on
the choice of group leadership. This is followed by a
preliminary empirical test of the model in Sect. 9.
Section 10 concludes.
2 Joint liability lending
Generally speaking, microfinance programmes pro-
vide credit to the poor, either through joint liability
group lending, or through individual-based lending.
While the latter comes close to traditional banking,
involving a direct relationship between the pro-
gramme and an individual, the joint liability lending
approach uses groups of borrowers to which loans are
made. Currently, the majority of microfinance bor-
rowers have access to loans through group lending
programmes. According to one recent survey of a
sample of microfinance programmes, only 16% of
these made use of so-called group lending to provide
credit to the poor, yet they served more than two-
thirds of all borrowers from the microfinance pro-
grammes included in the survey (Lapenu and Zeller
2001).
With joint liability lending the group of borrowers
is made responsible for the repayment of the loan, i.e.,
all group members are jointly liable. Thus, if one
group member does not repay her loan, others may
have to contribute so as to ensure repayment.
Nonrepayment by the group means that all group
members will be denied future access to loans from
the programme. In this way, group lending creates
incentives for individual group members to screen
and monitor other members of the group and to
enforce repayment in order to reduce the risk of
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having to contribute to the repayment of loans of
others and to ensure access to future loans. Thus, joint
liability group lending stimulates screening, monitor-
ing, and enforcement of contracts among borrowers,
reducing or erasing the agency costs of the lender.
Moreover, the group lending structure is also
expected to be more effective in providing such
activities as compared with the lender, because group
members usually live close to each other and/or have
social ties (also referred to as social capital in the
existing literature). They are therefore better
informed about each other’s activities. Since joint
liability group lending stimulates screening, monitor-
ing, and enforcement within the group, and since it
improves the effectiveness of these activities due to
geographical proximity and close social ties, repay-
ment performance of group loans is expected to
be high.
Several theoretical models confirm that joint
liability group lending leads to increasingly more
effective screening, monitoring, and enforcement
among group members. Some of these models
explicitly focus on the properties of joint liability
lending related to mitigating information asymme-
tries. For example, models by Stiglitz (1990) and
Varian (1990), Banerjee et al. (1994), Armenda´riz de
Aghion (1999), and Chowdhury (2005) explicitly deal
with moral hazard and monitoring problems, showing
how joint liability may help to solve these problems.
Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Gangopadhyay et al. (2005),
among others, provide models focusing on adverse
selection and screening. Some other models specifi-
cally discuss the role of social ties within group
lending in improving repayment performance of
groups. The work of Besley and Coate (1995) and
Wydick (2001) falls into this category of models.
Despite the fact that there are several theoretical
analyses explaining how joint liability group lending
may solve problems of information asymmetry,
there are hardly any models explicitly focusing on
different types of interaction between group mem-
bers and the consequences for individual behav-
ior. In particular, models do not pay attention to
strategic behavior of individuals within a group.
Existing theoretical models typically assume that the
lending group consists of only two identical persons.
In this setting, peer monitoring is necessarily mutual
in order to make the joint liability contract work
(Armenda´riz de Aghion 1999). However, if the
group consists of more than two members, the
monitoring effort of an individual member may well
depend on the monitoring effort of her peers, giving
rise to the possibility of strategic behavior.
The model of Armenda´riz de Aghion (1999)
provides the first attempt to study the monitoring
behavior of individuals in a lending group with more
than two borrowers. In her setup, the group consists
of three individuals who all can monitor each other to
see whether one is unable or unwilling to meet her
debt repayment, or stated differently, whether or not a
group member defaults strategically. The model
focuses on the partial equilibrium in which one of
the group members is monitored by the other two.
The two monitoring individuals are assumed to be
symmetric, leading to a unique symmetric equilib-
rium in which both monitors put in an equal level of
monitoring.
However, in reality, interests of group members
may diverge, which may lead to asymmetric moni-
toring incentives. One clear example of this is the
situation in which expected future profits are different
for different group members. If this is the case,
members have different interests in having access to
future loans from the program. This in turn gives
members different incentives to monitor the other
group members. These different incentives among
individuals to monitor each other may also explain
why some individuals volunteer to become a group
leader.
The model we present in the following sections
makes use of the idea that group members may
strategically behave when it comes to monitoring
each other to explain why individuals volunteer for
being the group leader, even if this is a costly task. In
particular, we investigate strategic decisions concern-
ing peer monitoring in a group lending program with
three borrowers. We start by assuming that the
lending group consists of three asymmetric entrepre-
neurs and that these entrepreneurs only differ from
each other with respect to the future profits their
projects generate. It is also assumed that the two
individuals with the highest future payoffs put high
effort into their projects to increase the probability
that the loan is continued. The borrower with the
project that has lowest future profitability shirks on
putting effort into her project if she is not monitored,
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because the higher disutility when supplying more
effort dominates the higher expected (future) profits
due to the increased probability that the loan is
continued. This thus gives the other two borrowers an
incentive to monitor. In the benchmark model, in
which there is no group leader, we obtain that in
equilibrium the individual with the highest future
payoffs provides the highest level of peer monitoring.
This is due to two effects. First, the borrower with the
highest expected future profits cares most about the
continuation of the loan, which gives her the highest
incentive to monitor. Second, because both monitors
take into account each other’s optimal monitoring
strategies, the second most profitable entrepreneur
reduces her monitoring effort as a result of the high
monitoring effort provided by the most profitable
borrower. Vice versa, given the lower level of peer
monitoring of the second most profitable entrepre-
neur, the most profitable borrower increases her
monitoring effort even more. Analogously to quantity
in a strategic duopoly, monitoring effort levels are
strategic substitutes.
Next, we introduce the presence of a group leader.
This means that one of the individuals in the group
has to become the group leader, or otherwise the
group cannot be formed. We argue that, despite the
obligation to fulfil various tasks, being a group leader
can be beneficial, because the leader has extra
monitoring options that the nonleaders do not have;
for example, a group leader chairs group meetings,
plans meetings when there are repayment problems,
etc. Assuming a convex monitoring cost function,
these extra monitoring options reduce the per-unit
costs of monitoring effort.
We first show that, in the presence of a group
leader, and assuming that it is exogenously deter-
mined who the leader will be, the equilibrium
monitoring effort of the borrower who now is the
leader is higher than in the benchmark case, while the
level of peer monitoring of the nonleader is lower.
This is due to the fact that monitoring is a strategic
substitute. Second, we find that, in the case in which
the choice of group leadership is endogenous, the
individual with the highest future payoffs under
certain circumstances volunteers to be the group
leader, even if she has to incur a disutility of
performing the cumbersome tasks that come with
the leadership. Due to the more efficient monitoring,
the leader exerts more monitoring effort on the
individual with the least profitable project to increase
the probability that the loan will be continued.
3 The basic model
We consider three risk-neutral entrepreneurs who
have the option to invest in a risky project, but need
funds from a risk-neutral outside investor (hereafter,
the bank) to finance the investment project. These
entrepreneurs are denoted by A, B, and C and initially
have no wealth. The funds needed by each entrepre-
neur are normalized to 1. In the remainder of the
analysis the debt repayments, denoted by dG, are
exogenously given in such a way that the expected
profits of the bank are always zero or positive.1
Furthermore, A, B, and C can only obtain funds if
they form a lending group together. If it is required by
the lending program, the group must choose one
member to be the group leader, otherwise the group
will not be formed and projects are cancelled.
In the first period that the project is carried out, the
expected payoff of a project only depends on the
effort supplied by the entrepreneur who undertakes
this specific project. Let pj be the probability that the
project will be a success with effort level j, where
j = H, L, and pH [ pL. The difference between these
probabilities is given by Dp = pH - pL. In this
context, j is the effort level of the project-specific
entrepreneur and is therefore the single determinant
of probability of success. Next, R1 [ 0 is the first-
period payoff of the project when the project
succeeds and R1 = 0 is the output when the project
is not successful. This first-period payoff is equal for
1 The assumption that dG is exogenously given implies that the
bank does not maximize profits. We assume that the bank
breaks even if B and C put in high effort and A provides low
effort, which is the case if there is no monitoring. Since in this
case the expected payoff for the investor equals
EPBANK = 3((1 - (1 - pH)
2(1 - pL))d
G - 1), the break-
even condition boils down to dG = 1/(1 - (1 - pH)
2(1 -
pL)). As we will show below, there are situations in which A
does provide high effort. The expected payoff for the bank then
becomes EPBANK = 3((1 - (1 - pH)
3)dG - 1), which is
strictly positive. Although we are aware of the fact that the
zero-profit condition for the investor is a standard assumption
in the literature, adopting this would heavily complicate our
analysis, without yielding important additional insights. In this
light, see Besley and Coate (1995) and Chowdhury (2005),
who also take the debt claim as an exogenous parameter.
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all three entrepreneurs. The expected returns for the
three group members in the first period become
lj = pjR1, with Dl = DpR1. However, putting in
high effort gives the entrepreneurs more disutility
than putting in low effort. We monetize this disutility
from providing effort by defining a parameter cj,
j = H, L, and Dc = cH - cL [ 0.
If each borrower repays her debt, all group
members obtain a new loan, which is needed to
continue the project in the following period. If one
or more group members default on their debt, the
nondefaulting member has to repay for them,
otherwise the group lending program is stopped.
If the projects are continued, the payoffs in the
next period, denoted by R2
i , i, i = A, B, C are not
the same across group members. Moreover, entre-
preneurs B and C cannot perfectly observe the
second-period payoffs of A, but do know that A’s
payoffs in the second period are randomly distrib-
uted on the interval [0, M]. It is assumed that A
herself exactly knows what her second-period
payoffs are. For ease of exposition and because
our analysis is concentrated on B and C monitoring
A, we assume that the payoffs in the second period
of B and C are perfectly observable by all and are
equal to R2
B = 2M and R2
C = 3M, respectively. This
means that, in the second period, C’s project is
always more profitable than B’s project, and
therefore it is in the best interest of C that the
loan be continued.2
Next, it is assumed that B and C always put in high
effort, independently of the actions of the other group
members, and moreover it is assumed that A always
shirks on putting in effort if she is not monitored. The
conditions for these assumptions to hold are stated in
the next section. The latter assumption means that the
moral hazard problem is present, giving group
members B and C a reason to monitor member A.
A monitor imposes a social cost Z on someone who is
caught shirking. The probability that someone who
monitors catches a shirking peer is given by ci. The
monitor herself can choose this probability and will
always choose ci = 1 if choosing so does not come at
a cost, because this gives the maximal threat of a
social sanction to the peer who is monitored.3
However, we will assume that monitoring is costly,
which means that setting a higher probability for
detecting a shirking group member also means higher
costs. The crucial aspect in the analysis is the
assumption that the per-unit monitoring costs are
lower for the group leader than for the nonleaders in
the group, which may work as an incentive to become
the group leader. In the next section, we treat this
issue in more detail.
The model consists of four periods and the timing
is as follows: at t = 0, the entrepreneurs form a
group, (if needed) decide on who becomes the group
leader, and borrow the funds from the bank.4 In the
next period each entrepreneur chooses the effort to
put into the project and the monitoring effort. At
t = 2, payoffs are realized and the total debt claim is
paid off if at least one entrepreneur is successful. The
bank continues the loan only if all loans are repaid. A
social sanction Z is imposed if someone is caught
providing low effort. At t = 3, the entrepreneurs
realize a certain payoff R2
i in case the projects were
continued at t = 2 and a zero payoff otherwise.
Hereafter, the world ends.
4 Moral hazard
First, we show under what condition the moral hazard
problem exists in this model. In this context, moral
hazard occurs if entrepreneur A provides low effort,
given that entrepreneurs B and C do not monitor A.
This leads B and C to monitor A’s behavior, because
low effort by A reduces their expected profits. In
order to derive the condition for the existence of
moral hazard, we determine the optimal choices for
entrepreneur A. As we have already assumed, B and
C will always choose to provide high effort, so that
the total payoffs for A equal
2 Because it does not change the analysis drastically, we
consider for simplicity that the returns in the second period are
independent of the effort level.
3 We assume that the entrepreneur who is monitored can
perfectly observe the probability that she will be caught if she
puts in low effort.
4 It is assumed that there is no discounting between periods.
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The first element of pj
A gives the expected profits
for A when all projects turn out to be successful. Note
that, in this situation, A only has to repay her own
debt claim and joint liability plays no role in this
case. For the following case, A does have to repay for
one of her peers, because this peer was not successful,
while A (and B or C) was. We assume that each of
the successful ones come up with half of the debt
claim the bank has on the defaulting peer. In the third
case, A even has to pay for both peers, because she
was the only one who had a positive payoff. The
fourth element gives profits if A’s project failed, but
at least one of her peers is able to repay for her.
Notice that, although A does not obtain any profits in
the first period, the second-period profits are obtained
due to the joint liability structure of the loan. In the
last case, none of the entrepreneurs were successful,
which results in the loan being stopped at t = 1 and
second-period profits cannot be obtained. From this,
we get that the expected payoff for entrepreneur A
flowing from the project is given by
EpAj ðjHHÞ ¼ lj þ ½pjp2H þ 2pH  2pjpH  p2H þ pj
 RA2 ½p2H þ 3ð1  pHÞpjdG  cj ð1Þ
To ensure that the moral hazard problem is
present, we assume throughout the paper that
Assumption 1
2MDc þ Dpðbd
G  R1Þ
aDp
M;
with a  p2H  2pH þ 1 and b  p2H þ 3ð1  pHÞ
Assumption 1 assures that A always puts in low effort
if she is not monitored. Therefore, B and C have an
incentive to monitor A, given that the social cost that
can be imposed on A if she is caught shirking is high
enough. Moreover, from assumption 1 we know that
B and C always supply high effort, because they both
have second-period profits at least as high as 2M,
which is higher than the benefits from providing low
effort.
5 Monitoring technology
In the previous section, we stated that group members
B and C always fully monitor if monitoring is costless.
However, this assumption is not realistic, which is why
we only consider the case where monitoring is costly.
To see why someone who monitors others incurs costs,
notice that monitoring requires putting in efforts,
devouring (a substantial amount of) resources and time
that the group member could otherwise have spent on
her own project. As we shall demonstrate below, the
crucial aspect in our model is that the group leader has
a different monitoring cost function than the nonlead-
ers within the group. More formally, we state that the
monitoring cost function of a nonleader in the group is
given by
cðciÞ ¼
j
2
ðciÞ2; ci  1; ð2Þ
while for a leader the monitoring cost function is
denoted by
cGLðciÞ ¼
j
4
ðciÞ2; ci  1; ð3Þ
where ci is the individual monitoring effort of
entrepreneur i, i = B, C, and j is an efficiency
parameter; it is assumed that this parameter is the
same for B and C. From this, we get that in our
analysis the per-unit monitoring costs are lower for
the group leader than for the nonleaders.
To justify the different cost functions for the leader
and nonleader, we argue the following: it is fair to say
that the group leader has at least all the monitoring
options the others have, and very likely, has some extra
options the others do not have. As was explained
above, a group leader chairs group meetings, plans
meetings when there are repayment problems, etc.
Moreover, it is assumed that the additional monitoring
options available to the group leader are as effective as
the options all group members (i.e., the leader and
the nonleaders) have, which means that these addi-
tional options can be treated as a duplication of the
pAj
R1  dG  cj þ RA2 with probability pjp2H
R1  1 12 dG  cj þ RA2 with probability 2pjpHð1  pHÞ
R1  3dG  cj þ RA2 with probability pjð1  pHÞ2
cj þ RA2 with probability ð2  pHÞð1  pjÞpH
cj with probability ð1  pjÞð1  pHÞ2
8
>>
><
>
>>:
9
>>
>=
>
>>;
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monitoring possibilities of the nonleaders. Next, we
argue that the monitoring options are subject to a
decline in marginal effectiveness, hence the quadratic
term in the cost functions. Solving the simple cost-
minimization problem of the group leader shows that
the leader divides her monitoring effort equally over
the different options, which results in the cost function
given by Eq. 3.
In the next section we first discuss the case in
which the group does not have a group leader and all
group members have the same monitoring cost
functions. The results we obtain from this case are
mainly used as a benchmark case, which we compare
with the results we get if we model the presence of
the group leader.
6 Monitoring without group leadership
In the case when there is no group leader, B and C
have the same cost function, which is given by Eq. 2.
To determine the optimal monitoring efforts, we not
only have to know the cost structure of monitoring,
but also the benefits of it. Clearly, the benefits of
monitoring are that the probability that A will supply
high effort increases, given that the monitor can
impose a high enough social sanction on A if A is
caught shirking. Note that the probability that A is
monitored effectively by at least one peer equals
CA = 1 - (1 - cB)(1 - cC), which means that B’s
decision to monitor clearly depends on C’s monitor-
ing decision and vice versa. Given that they both
provide high effort, the extra profits B and C make
when A supplies high effort equal
DEpi ¼ Dp 11=2  pH
 
pHd
G þ ð1  pHÞ2Ri2
 
; ð4Þ
with i = B, C.
From this, we can see that the extra profits B and C
make when A provides high effort equal the differ-
ence in probability of success times a term that both
depends on joint liability and second-period profits.
Remember that we assumed that the second-period
profits are always higher for C than for B. This means
that B and C are asymmetric in the sense that they
have a different valuation for A’s effort level. As we
will see below, this results in an asymmetric equilib-
rium. The extra profits that B and C make if A puts in
high effort have to be multiplied by the change in
probability that A provides high effort to calculate the
expected profits of monitoring. Therefore, the net
expected profits of supplying monitoring effort ci
equal
PiðciÞ ¼ P RA2 
Dc þ DpðbdG  R1Þ  ZCAðciÞ
aDp
 
 DEpi  j
2
ðciÞ2; ð5Þ
with i = B, C.
For the sake of exposition, we use x  11=2  pH
 
pHd
G þ 2ð1  pHÞ2MÞ
.
M and y  11=2  pH
 
pHd
G

þ3ð1  pHÞ2MÞ
.
M in the remainder of the analysis.
Maximizing expected profits with respect to monitor-
ing efforts yields first-order conditions5
cB ¼ xZajð1  cCÞ
cC ¼ yZajð1  cBÞ:
ð6Þ
These first-order conditions can be seen as reaction
functions, as both entrepreneurs make their monitor-
ing decision dependent on the monitoring level of the
other. Moreover, the levels of monitoring effort are
strategic substitutes in the sense that an entrepreneur
reduces her monitoring effort if the other increases
her effort (see also Fig. 1). We can then formulate the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given that no one in the group is the
leader and that entrepreneurs simultaneously decide
on their monitoring effort, the entrepreneur with the
highest second-period payoffs puts in the highest
monitoring effort.
Proof The proof is fairly simple. Substituting the
first-order conditions into each other gives equilib-
rium monitoring efforts cB ¼ ðaj yZÞxZðajÞ2  xyZ2 and cC ¼ðaj xZÞyZ
ðajÞ2  xyZ2. We get that cC [ cB if x \ y, which holds
by assumption. This gives that the entrepreneur with
the highest second-period payoffs, which is C, puts in
more monitoring effort than the one with the lower
second-period payoffs, which is B. QED.
This result is due to two different causes. First,
entrepreneur C has higher second-period payoffs,
which means that she has more interest in the
5 We assume aj [ yZ, which ensures that 0 \ cB \ 1 and
0 \ cC \ 1. This means that we only have to consider interior
solutions.
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continuation of the loan than B and benefits more from
the monitoring efforts. Secondly, because B knows
that it is most beneficial for C that A is monitored
effectively, she also realizes that C puts in a
substantial amount of monitoring effort. This reduces
the incentive for B to supply monitoring effort.
7 Monitoring with group leadership
In the above analysis, we abstracted from the issue of
group leadership and assumed that the group did not
need a group leader. However, in reality we often see
that a lending group needs a leader, who is the
intermediary between the outside investor and the
group itself. As we already discussed, a leader is likely
to have more monitoring options than the nonleaders,
which reduces per-unit monitoring costs. If this is the
case, it may be beneficial for an entrepreneur to
become the group leader, even if being a group leader
means having to perform some (other than monitoring)
cumbersome tasks. The (utility) loss of executing these
tasks is modeled by introducing the fixed costs F that
the group leader has to incur. These fixed costs will be
introduced in the model in the next section, where we
endogenize the choice to become the leader. In this
section, however, we exogenously determine who will
be the group leader.
7.1 Monitoring with C as group leader
Suppose that entrepreneur C is the group leader. In
this case the monitoring cost function of C is given by
Eq. 3, while the monitoring cost function of B
remains that given by Eq. 2. The expected profits of
monitoring equal
PBðcGLCB Þ ¼ P RA2 
Dc þ DpðbdG  R1Þ  ZCAðcGLCB Þ
aDp
 
 DEpB  j
2
ðcGLCB Þ2
PiðcGLCC Þ ¼ P RA2 
Dc þ DpðbdG  R1Þ  ZCAðcGLCC Þ
aDp
 
 DEpC  j
4
ðcGLCC Þ2;
ð7Þ
where cB
GLC and cC
GLC are the monitoring efforts of B
and C, respectively, when entrepreneur C is the
leader. The first-order conditions boil down to6
cGLCB ¼
xZ
aj
ð1  cCÞ
cGLCC ¼
2yZ
aj
ð1  cBÞ:
ð8Þ
We can formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Given that the entrepreneur with the
highest second-period profits becomes the group
leader and that the entrepreneurs simultaneously
choose their monitoring level, the leader now mon-
itors more than in the case where there is no leader,
while the nonleader monitors less compared with the
situation in which there is no group leader.
Proof From Eq. 8, we obtain equilibrium monitor-
ing levels equal to cGLCB ¼ ðaj 2yZÞxZðajÞ2  2xyZ2 and cGLCC
¼ 2ðaj xZÞyZðajÞ2  2xyZ2. Comparing these outcomes with the
equilibrium levels when the group has no leader, we
see that cB
GLC \ cB and cC
GLC [ cC if aj[ xZ, which
holds by assumption. QED.
The intuition behind this is as follows: due to the
lower monitoring costs and given a certain monitoring
effort of B, C wants to monitor A more, i.e., her
reaction function shifts outwards. Anticipating this, B
supplies less monitoring effort than in the case where
there is no leader. Notice that this is the result of the
monitoring efforts being strategic substitutes (see also
Fig. 2).
1
↑
Bγ →C                    1 
0E
→Cγ                            1 
→Cγ 0E           1 
( )BC γγ
( )CB γγ
10E
↑
Cγ
Fig. 1 Reaction curves for monitoring effort, equilibrium at
E0
6 In this situation, we assume aj [ 2yZ, so that we again only
consider interior solutions.
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Although the per-unit costs of monitoring for C are
lower in this case than if there is no group leader, it can
be shown that the total monitoring costs of C are now
higher due to the higher level of monitoring effort that
C puts in.7 One may think that, given this result, C is
never willing to be the leader. Notice, however, that
because of the different monitoring levels in both cases
the probability that A is effectively monitored (and
therefore the probability that A provides high effort)
also differs between the cases. We get that if aj[ xyZ,
this probability is higher in the case where C is the
leader than when there is no leader in the group. Later,
when we endogenize the choice of becoming the
leader, we will be more specific about the equilibrium
costs and benefits for C when she is the leader.
7.2 Monitoring with B as group leader
If B is the group leader, we can perform a similar
kind of analysis as if C were the leader, but now with
the monitoring cost function for B given by Eq. 3,
while C’s monitoring cost function is stated by Eq. 2.
We then come to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the entrepreneur with the lower
second-period payoffs is the group leader, her
monitoring effort is higher than in the case where
there is no group leader, while the monitoring effort
of the entrepreneur with the highest profits in the
second period, i.e., the nonleader in this situation, is
now lower. Moreover, the leader may monitor more
or less than the nonleader, depending on the debt
claim of the bank and the difference between the
profits both entrepreneurs can generate in the second
period. For our choice of second-period payoffs of B
and C, RB
2 = 2M and RC
2 = 3M, the leader (B) puts in
more monitoring effort than the entrepreneur with the
highest second-period payoffs (C).
Proof Again, from the first-order conditions we
obtain equilibrium monitoring levels of B and C equal
to cGLBB ¼ 2ðaj yZÞxZðajÞ2  2xyZ2 and cGLBC ¼
ðaj 2xZÞyZ
ðajÞ2  2xyZ2, respec-
tively. Comparing these levels with the equilibrium
levels in the case when there is no group leader gives
that B monitors more and C monitors less if aj[ yZ,
which holds by assumption. Next, the monitoring
level of B is higher than the level of C if 2x [ y, or if
11=2  pH
 
pHd
G þ ð1  pHÞ2ð2R2B  R2CÞ[ 0. Sub-
stituting the exogenously given second-period
returns into this condition gives 11=2  pH
 
pHd
Gþ
ð1  pHÞ2M [ 0; which yields that for these payoffs B
monitors more than C. However, if the difference in
second-period payoffs is high and the debt claim is
low, it may be that 2x \ y, in which case the leader
monitors less than the nonleader. QED.
Again, it can be shown that the total monitoring
costs of the group leader are higher than in the case
where there is no leader.
8 Endogenous choice of group leadership
In the above analysis it was exogenously given which
entrepreneur would be the leader. However, if the group
members are free to choose whether they will lead the
group, in equilibrium all entrepreneurs follow their best
strategy. We only focus on equilibria in which entre-
preneur B and C are willing to become the group leader,
otherwise there would be no leader and the group would
not exist.8 We then come to the following proposition.
1 
1E    1 
( )BC γγ
( )CB γγ
1
1E
1E
Fig. 2 Reaction curves when C is the group leader, equilib-
rium at E1
7 More formally, the monitoring costs for C in the case where
there is no group leader equal CðcCÞ ¼ j=2 ðaj xZÞyZðajÞ2  xyZ2
 2
; while
C’s monitoring costs are CðcGLC Þ ¼ j=4 2ðaj xZÞyZðajÞ2  2xyZ2
 2
if she
herself is the group leader. The former is smaller than the latter
if ðajÞ2 ﬃﬃﬃ2p  1 þ xyZ2 2  ﬃﬃﬃ2p [ 0; which always holds.
8 Here, we assume that the costs of being the group leader F
are high enough that it is never profitable for A to be the leader,
even if the other two are not willing to lead the group.
Moreover, we assume that F is low enough to ensure that B and
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Proposition 4 If the entrepreneur with the highest
second-period payoffs volunteers to be the group
leader, the entrepreneur with the lower profits in the
second period always agrees with this. Therefore, we
have a self-enforcing equilibrium in which the former
will always be the group leader.
Proof To see why it is always more profitable for B
that C is the group leader instead of herself, notice
that we already obtained that the total monitoring
costs for B are higher if she herself is the leader than
if C leads the group. Moreover, on the benefit side,
the probability that A is monitored effectively is
higher in the case that C takes the leadership than
in the situation where B is the leader if (1 - cB
GLC)
(1 - cC
GLC) \ (1 - cB
GLB)(1 - cC
GLB). This condition
is always satisfied given that y [ x. Concluding, for B
the costs are higher while the benefits are lower if B
instead of C is the group leader, which makes it
unprofitable for B to be the leader if C volunteers to
lead the group. QED.
Now we have to determine under which condition
entrepreneur C is willing to be the group leader. In
contrast to B, there are two opposing effects for C if
she is the group leader. On the one hand, being the
leader means incurring a fixed cost and higher
monitoring costs (F), but on the other hand, the
probability of effective monitoring under C’s leader-
ship is higher.
Proposition 5 If F \
y 1=2y x
 
ðajZÞ2þðxyZ2Þ2
ððajÞ2  2xyZ2Þ2 ; entre-
preneur C volunteers to lead the group.9
Proof As we already pointed out, if C leads the group
instead of B the probability that A is monitored
effectively is higher. Therefore, the extra benefits C
makes by being the leader equal DPC ¼ PGLCC 
PGLBC ¼ a
2j3yZ2ðy xÞ
ððajÞ2  2xyZ2Þ2. However, being the leader
means incurring both a fixed costs of being
group leader equal DCC ¼ CðcGLCC Þ  CðcGLBC Þ
¼
1=2ðajÞ
2 ðxZÞ2
 
ðyZÞ2
ððajÞ2  2xyZ2Þ2 . This means that entrepreneur C
volunteers to be the group leader if DP - DC –
F [ 0, or if F \
y 1=2y x
 
ðajZÞ2þðxyZ2Þ2
ððajÞ2  2xyZ2Þ2 . QED.
Figure 3 illustrates the extra profits entrepre-
neur C makes if she instead of B is the leader for
parameter values pL = 0.2, pH = 0.5, j = 8, and
0 B M B 10. For small values of M, the condition
aj[ 2yZ is violated. For the feasible range of M we
see that the extra profits decrease as M increases.
The intuition behind this result is that, as M
becomes bigger, the relative difference between
the profitability of B’s project and C’s project, and
therefore the difference in monitoring effort pro-
vided, becomes smaller. This means that the prob-
ability that A is monitored effectively is not much
higher in the case that C is the leader than if B leads
the group.
The main conclusions from the theoretical model
is that the group member with the highest expected
second-period payoff has the strongest incentive to
volunteer to become the group leader, since the
additional returns from increasing efforts to monitor
A’s behavior are higher, taking into account the fact
that B will lower monitoring efforts due to strategic
behavior. These conclusions lead us to specify the
following empirically testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis Group members with projects that
generate high future profits will volunteer to become
Fig. 3 C’s extra profits of being the leader if pL = 0.2,
pH = 0.5, j = 8, and 0 B M B 10
Footnote 8 continued
C want to take the leadership if the group would otherwise not
exist (see also footnote 9).
9 If the costs of being the group leader F yðy=2 xÞðajZÞ2þðxyZ2Þ2ððajÞ2  2xyZ2Þ ;
B and C need to negotiate about who will become the group
leader. Since for C the stakes are higher, we expect that B has a
better bargaining position and C ends up being the group leader.
However, in this paper we abstract from bargaining issues and
focus on the case where F\yðy=2 xÞðajZÞ
2þðxyZ2Þ2
ððajÞ2  2xyZ2Þ .
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the group leader. For these members future access to
loans is more important, which means that they value
future access to loans more highly than do other
group members.10
9 The role of the group leader: empirical
evidence from Eritrea
9.1 Microfinance in Eritrea
In this next section, we test the hypothesis derived at
the end of Sect. 8, using data from a questionnaire
among individuals participating in two joint liability
programs in Eritrea. In the year 2000 (the year in
which we conducted our survey) there were two
group lending programs operating in Eritrea. The
Saving and Micro Credit program (SMCP) is active
since 1996 and is part of the Eritrean Community
Development Fund (ECDF), a government-related
fund. The funding for this program comes from the
Eritrean government, the World Bank, and from
grants from a number of individual donor countries.
The Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme
(SZSCS) started in 1994 and was launched by the
Agency for Co-operation and Research in Develop-
ment (ACORD), a British nongovernmental organi-
zation (NGO). SMCP has activities all over the
country, whereas SZSCS concentrates its efforts in
the southern part of Eritrea.
The activities and organization of both programs
are very similar. They are both active in rural as well
as urban areas. The borrowers in both programs are
active as retailers, farmers or small-scale producers.
Both programs are set up along the lines of the
Grameen Bank model. Groups are formed through
self-selection; they consist of 3–7 members. After a
group is accepted by one of the two programs, the
group has to select a group leader. This selection is
random, which means that in principle the group can
select any one of its members and that any member
can volunteer to become the leader. The group leader
is the intermediary between the group and the
program staff (i.e., the program’s credit officer and/
or the village credit committee or bank). He/she has
to regularly report to the program’s staff on the
performance and sustainability of the group. More-
over, he/she has to chair group meetings, collect the
installment payments from group members and
transfer them to the credit officer, visit group
members regularly and discusses business- and/or
group-related problems, and call for extra group
meetings if repayment problems occur. Based on this
description of tasks, we conclude that the group
leader plays a prominent role in the functioning of the
group. Being a group leader is a voluntary activity; it
does not generate any (financial) remuneration.
9.2 The data
During 2000 we conducted a survey among 111
groups, of which 59 were in SMCP and 52 were in
SZSCS. Most of these groups were based in small
villages and secondary towns of Eritrea. In the survey
we asked questions about the socioeconomic charac-
teristics of the group members, as well as about the
saving and repayment performance of individual
group members. In addition, we included questions
on the group formation process, the existence of
social ties, and on processes of screening, monitoring,
and enforcement within groups. From each group we
aimed at selecting the group leader and one or more
other members to answer the questions.11 Part of the
questions was submitted to both the group leader and
the other member(s) of each group; another part of
the questions was specifically asked to the group
leader. The survey was carried out only once, which
means we have cross-sectional static data (i.e., only
data for one year).
10 One referee pointed out that our model could also be used to
explain the group formation process, i.e., the future leader may
be the one who has mobilized the group. In this context, our
model can be interpreted as follows: If the costs of leading the
group are not too high, the entrepreneur with the highest
expected second-period payoffs has incentives to form a group.
She needs to form a group in order to be able to get access to a
loan in the second period and realize her second-period project.
Because of this she also has strong incentives to make sure the
group makes it to the second period, meaning that she is
willing to become the leader. The fact that she volunteers to
become the leader enables her to attract other (less profitable)
entrepreneurs to form a group. These less profitable entrepre-
neurs are willing to join the group, since the leadership (and the
costs associated with this) is taken by the most profitable group
leader, whereas at the same time they get access to finance as
well. We thank the reviewer for pointing out this alternative
interpretation of our model.
11 For 9 of the 111 groups we were unable to ask questions to
the group leader.
Group lending and the role of the group leader 309
123
Through the questionnaire we obtained information
from 351 group members, of whom 102 were group
leaders. Of the total sample of group members, 167
were participating in the SZSCS program and 184 in
the SMCP program. Within the sample, 196 borrowers
were females (56%) and 155 were males. The majority
(68%) of the respondents had no or only primary
education. The average monthly income of group
members was 1,017 Nakfas, the national currency of
Eritrea (approximately USD 7512). Trade (63%) and
farming (17%) were the main occupations of group
members; many of them usually had two (or more)
occupations at the same time. On average, groups
were composed of 4.5 members, with a median of
four, ranging from a minimum of three to a maximum
of seven members. The number of loan cycles (or loan
rounds) that groups had completed up to the interview
ranged from a minimum of two to a maximum of
seven with an average of 3.6 cycles. Group loans
ranged from 750 Nakfa (USD 54) to 8,500 Nakfa
(USD 607), with mean and median loan size of 3,948
Nakfa (USD 282) and 3,500 Nakfa (USD 250),
respectively. Loan terms varied from 3 to 24 months.
Group members mainly used the loans for working
capital purposes. Most respondents indicated they had
never applied for a loan from a commercial bank.
Of the 102 group leaders, 46 were in a group in the
SZSCS program and 56 in a group of the SMCP
program; 54 of them were males (53%) and 48 were
females. Group leaders’ income was somewhat
higher (1,109 Nakfa, or USD 79) than the average
income level of all group members in the sample.
They were also very similar to the average group
member in terms of occupation: 60% of them were
active in trade, whereas 15% were active in farming.
9.3 The methodology
The survey allows us to investigate why an individual
volunteers to become group leader. In the survey we
have information on several characteristics of indi-
vidual members such as age, sex, education, religion,
marital status, income, primary activity, and whether
they have access to finance other than microfinance.
Moreover, we have information about the extent to
which individuals know the other members of the
group and whether they have prior information about
them. We also have information about several group
characteristics. However, in the context of this study,
group-level characteristics cannot be used, since the
dependent variable indicates whether or not an
individual is the group leader, and every group has
a group leader. This rules out the possibility of a
multilevel analysis including both group- and indi-
vidual-level characteristics.13
Of particular interest for our analysis in this paper
is a variable in the survey that indicates the value a
group member attaches to having access to loans
from the credit program in the future. This variable is
called VFACCESS and takes values ranging from 1
(=very high value) to 4 (=very low value). Group
members that value future access to loans higher than
other members are expected to have projects that
generate high future profits and they are therefore
more willing to volunteer to become the group leader.
If this is true, we expect to find a negative correlation
between being a group leader and the value of
VFACCESS (negative because of the way this
variable has been measured).
To test this hypothesis of the negative relationship
between being the group leader and VFACCESS, we
set up an empirical model, in which the dependent
variable LEADER is a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if a group member is the leader and the
value 0 otherwise. In the analysis, we use a probit
estimator, which enables us to establish the determi-
nants influencing the probability that someone is a
group leader. Next to the variable VFACCESS we
use a list of control variables measuring individual
characteristics of group members that may influence
the probability that someone is the group leader. In
particular, we have three main groups of individual
characteristics: one referring to personal characteris-
tics, one referring to economic characteristics, and
one referring to information that an individual has
about the other group members.
The group of personal characteristics consists of
the following variables:
12 Using an exchange rate of USD 1 = 14 Nakfa. This was the
official exchange rate at the time the data for this research were
gathered.
13 Group-level variables may, however, moderate the impact
of individual characteristics on the probability of being the
group leader. This possibility is investigated explicitly later on,
when we investigate the impact of gender on the probability of
someone being a group leader.
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– AGE is the age of the group member (in years);
– EDUCATION measures the educational back-
ground of the group member, ranging from 1
(=illiterate) to 4 (=has finished secondary education);
– MARRIED is a dummy variable, being 1 if the
group member is married and 0 if he/she is not; and
– MOSLEM is a dummy variable, being 1 if the
group member is a Moslem and 0 otherwise.
AGE is included in the model as it may be argued
that there is a higher probability that older members
are elected as the leader. Older members are more
experienced and have more authority vis-a`-vis young-
er group members. EDUCATION may be related to
becoming the group leader: more highly educated
members may have more authority based upon their
knowledge skills vis-a`-vis other members. MARRIED
is included based on the premise that, if an individual is
married and may thus have a family to support, he/she
has more incentives to make the group successful in
order to be able to obtain access to finance. Approx-
imately half the Eritrean population is Sunni Moslem
and the other half is Christian. For the religious
dummy MOSLEM we have no a priori expectations
with respect to how religion may influence the
probability of someone becoming the group leader.
The economic characteristics are:
– INCOME is the monthly income of the group
member, in Nakfas;
– CREDIT is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
the group member has had access to any other type
of external finance (i.e., loans from a commercial
bank, moneylender, family or friends, or trade
credit) and 0 if this is not the case;
– TRADER is a dummy variable, being 1 if the
group member’s main occupation is being a trader
and 0 otherwise; and
– FARMER is a dummy variable, being 1 if the
group member’s main occupation is being a
farmer and 0 otherwise.
We include INCOME as an explanatory variable
explaining why an individual may become group
leader based on the idea that someone earning a
higher income may be seen as more economically
successful in the past, making this person the best
candidate of being the leader. CREDIT is included
because individuals having access to other financial
sources may care less about obtaining microfinance
loans, making them also less eager to become the
group leader. We include TRADER and FARMER to
take into account the potential effect that differences
in economic activities may have on the probability of
someone becoming the group leader.
Finally, the group of variables referring to the
information that an individual has about the other
group members consists of the following variables:
– BORN is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
the group member was born in the same area where
the survey was held and 0 if this is not the case;
– KNOWACT is a dummy variable, being 1 if the
group member indicates he/she has information
about the activities of the other group members
related to the use of the loan and 0 if he/she
indicates not having this information;
– KNOWMEM is a dummy variable, being 1 if the
group member indicates he/she knew the other
group members before the group was formed and
0 if he/she indicates this was not the case;
– KNOWSALES is a dummy variable, being 1 if
the group member indicates he/she knows the
monthly sales of the other group members and 0
if this is not the case;
– LIVE is the number of years that the individual
has lived in the area where he/she was inter-
viewed; and
– CHGROUP is a dummy variable taking the value 1
if the group member indicates he/she has ever been
a member of another group and 0 if this is not the
case.
The above listed variables are all proxies for the
extent to which an individual has information about
his/her fellow group members and their activities and
behavior. BORN, LIVE, and CHGROUP are indirect
measures of having this type of information. If
someone is born or has lived for a long time in the
community where the group resides, he/she is
expected to have more information about the people
who live there. On the other hand, if an individual has
changed groups one or more times, this may reduce
the information he/she may have regarding the
activities related to the use of the loan. KNOWACT,
KNOWMEM, and KNOWSALES are more direct
measures of the information an individual has about
the activities and behavior of the other group
members. The fact that an individual has more
information about his/her fellow group members may
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give this individual an advantage vis-a`-vis the other
members, making him/her a potentially good candi-
date to become the group leader.
In conclusion, the complete empirical model can
be specified as follows:
LEADERi ¼ d0 þ d1VFACCESS þ dk¼2...5PERSk;i
þ dm¼6...9ECONm;i þ dn¼10...15INFOn;i
þ ei: ð9Þ
In this model, PERS is a vector of variables
representing personal characteristics, ECON is a
vector of variables referring to economic character-
istics, and INFO is a vector of variables covering the
informational characteristics of individual group
members. Thus, in the complete version of the model
we have 15 control variables, as well as the variable
of interest, i.e., VFACCESS.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the
variables listed above. The table shows that majority of
the group members attach a high value to future access
to loans from the program, as the mean value of
VFACCESS is 1.4 and the median is 1. As was
discussed briefly above, most group members have no
more than primary education: the mean of the variable
EDUCATION is 2.1, and the median is 2. Most group
members are married. A minority of them appears to
be Moslem; this does not reflect the religious distri-
bution in Eritrea, as half of the total population is
reported to be Moslem. This may be due to the fact that
the survey was carried out mainly in the highlands of
the country, which is predominantly Christian. Most
individuals report that they have no other sources of
credit, meaning that access to credit from the micro-
finance programs may be important for them. Infor-
mation about fellow group members, at least in terms
of knowing them before they entered the group
and knowing the type of their activities, is fairly high:
80–90% of the individuals in the sample report they
have this type of information. At the same time, they
have no information about the success of these
activities: only 5% report having information about
the monthly sales of their fellow group members.
Finally, a small minority of the group members in our
sample changed lending groups in the past.
In Table 4 in the appendix we provide the full
correlation matrix of all variables we use in our
empirical analysis. In general terms, the correlations
reported in this table are low and we therefore do not
expect to be confronted with problems of multicol-
linearity when running regression models.14
9.4 Empirical results
Table 2 presents the results of the estimations. As was
mentioned above, we apply the probit estimation
methodology. The estimations are carried out as
follows. First, we estimate the complete model,
including all personal, economic, and informational
variables, along with the variable of interest in the
analysis, i.e., VFACCESS. Next, we delete variables
for which we find the coefficient not being significant
at the 10% level and re-estimate the reduced version of
the model. We repeat this procedure until we are left
with a model that only includes variables for which we
find statistically significant coefficients.15,16
In the first column of Table 2 we show the
estimations of the complete model. The results show
that two variables are statistically significant. First of
all, and most important in the context of our analysis,
14 Correlations between the variables LIVE and AGE and
between LIVE and BORN are relatively high (see bold values
in the appendix table). These high values do make sense given
the definitions of the variables. In the empirical analysis
discussed below we ran regressions with and without inclusion
of LIVE and AGE and/or LIVE and BORN at the same time. In
both cases the regression results were almost exactly the same.
15 The econometric approach we have taken is also known as the
general-to-specific approach and was suggested by the referee,
for which we would like to think him/her. Another way of
approaching the econometric modeling is to take the specific-to-
general (or bottom-up) approach, which starts from a small
model, including only theoretically correct variables and then
tests various specifications of this smaller model. One important
advantage of the general-to-specific approach is that ‘‘…the
statistical consequences from excluding relevant variables are
usually considered more serious than those from including
irrelevant variables.’’ (Brooks 2002, pp. 209–210). We also used
the alternative approach, starting with a specification that only
includes the VFACCESS variable, and then subsequently adding
the control variables one by one, until the complete model is
specified. After estimating the complete model we then deleted
all variables for which we are unable to find a statistically
significant coefficient. This approach generates exactly the same
outcomes as the ones we discuss in the main text. The results of
the alternative approach are available from the authors on
request.
16 In Table 2 we report the marginal effects of the independent
variables on the dependent variable, instead of the coefficient
estimations, because in the context of a probit model the
marginal effects are more meaningful for considering the partial
effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable.
312 R. van Eijkel et al.
123
the variable of interest, i.e., VFACCESS, is signif-
icant and has the expected negative sign. This result
supports our hypothesis that the probability of
someone being a group leader is related to the value
a group member attaches to having access to loans
from the credit program in the future. Group mem-
bers that value future access to loans more highly than
other members (i.e., lower values of VFACCESS) are
expected to have projects that generate high future
profits and they are therefore more willing to
volunteer to become the group leader. Next to this
outcome, the variable EDUCATION is statistically
significant and has a positive sign. We interpret this
as evidence that individuals who have higher levels of
education have a higher probability of being a group
leader. Finally, the results in column [1] show that
some of the other variables are sometimes close to
being statistically significant; this holds for the
variables MOSLEM, INCOME, and one of the two
economic activity dummies (TRADER).
As explained in Sect. 9.3, the variable EDUCA-
TION is measured using an ordinal scale that runs
from 1 (the individual is illiterate) to 4 (the individual
has finished secondary education). However, inter-
pretation of this variable may be difficult, since it
assumes that the distance between 1 and 2 is similar
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev. Observations
LEADER 0.291 0 1 0 0.455 351
VFACCESS 1.387 1 4 1 0.640 351
AGE (years) 45.81 45 77 18 11.67 351
EDUCATION 2.057 2 4 1 0.893 351
MARRIED 0.781 1 1 0 0.414 351
MOSLEM 0.199 0 1 0 0.400 351
INCOME (Nakfa) 1,017 1,000 13,000 300 751.7 351
CREDIT 0.046 0 1 0 0.209 351
TRADER 0.638 1 1 0 0.481 351
FARMER 0.171 0 1 0 0.377 351
BORN 0.510 1 1 0 0.501 351
KNOWACT 0.875 1 1 0 0.332 351
KNOWMEM 0.820 1 1 0 0.385 350
KNOWSALES 0.054 0 1 0 0.227 351
LIVE (years) 31.93 31 77 2 19.31 351
CHGROUP 0.100 0 1 0 0.300 350
LEADER is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if a group member is the leader and 0 otherwise; VFACCESS is a variable that
indicates the value that a group member attaches to having access to loans from the credit program in the future and takes values
ranging from 1 (=very high value) to 4 (=very low value); AGE is the age of the group member (in years); EDUCATION measures
the educational background of the group member, ranging from 1 (=illiterate) to 4 (=has finished secondary education); MARRIED is
a dummy variable, being 1 if the group member is married and 0 if he/she is not; MOSLEM is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group
member is a Moslem and 0 otherwise. INCOME is the monthly income of the group member in Nakfas (the national currency of
Eritrea); CREDIT is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the group member has had access to any other type of external finance
(i.e., loans from a commercial bank, moneylender, family or friends, or trade credit) and 0 if this is not the case; TRADER is a
dummy variable, being 1 if the group member’s main occupation is being a trader and 0 otherwise; FARMER is a dummy variable,
being 1 if the group member’s main occupation is being a farmer and 0 otherwise; BORN is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
the group member was born in the same area where the survey was held and 0 if this is not the case; KNOWACT is a dummy
variable, being 1 if the group member indicates he/she has information about the activities of the other group members related to the
use of the loan and 0 if he/she indicates he/she does not have this information; KNOWMEM is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group
member indicates he/she knew the other group members before the group was formed and 0 if he/she indicates this was not the case;
KNOWSALES is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group members indicates he/she knows the monthly sales of the other group
members and 0 if this is not the case; LIVE is the number of years the individual has lived in the area where he/she was interviewed;
CHGROUP is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the group member indicates he/she has ever been a member of another group
and 0 if this is not the case
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Table 2 Estimation results of the determinants of being the group leader
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
VFACCESS -0.0789*
(0.061)
-0.0732*
(0.086)
VFACCESS01 -0.1143**
(0.034)
-0.1246**
(0.018)
-0.1208**
(0.021)
AGE 0.0001
(0.985)
0.0000
(0.991)
-0.0000
(0.995)
EDUCATION 0.0630**
(0.043)
ILLITERATE 0.0089
(0.944)
0.0179
(0.889)
PRIMARY 0.0822
(0.513)
0.0938
(0.457)
JSECONDARY 0.2371*
(0.071)
0.2478*
(0.060)
0.1887***
(0.001)
0.1802***
(0.002)
MARRIED 0.0349
(0.573)
0.0266
(0.671)
0.0233
(0.711)
MOSLEM 0.1030
(0.133)
0.1177*
(0.089)
0.1148*
(0.097)
0.1167*
(0.066)
0.1246**
(0.050)
INCOME 0.0000
(0.151)
0.0000
(0.169)
0.0000
(0.155)
CREDIT -0.0057
(0.961)
-0.0179
(0.879)
-0.0162
(0.890)
TRADER -0.0916
(0.151)
-0.1077*
(0.094)
-0.1087*
(0.091)
-0.0688
(0.182)
FARMER -0.1061
(0.197)
-0.1106
(0.180)
-0.1115
(0.174)
BORN 0.0287
(0.791)
0.0185
(0.866)
0.0162
(0.883)
KNOWACT 0.0659
(0.398)
0.0813
(0.301)
0.0775
(0.324)
KNOWMEM 0.0309
(0.657)
0.0223
(0.749)
0.0226
(0.747)
KNOWSALES -0.0581
(0.603)
-0.0643
(0.567)
-0.0730
(0.514)
LIVE 0.0004
(0.903)
0.0008
(0.815)
0.0008
(0.815)
CHGROUP -0.0110
(0.897)
-0.0053
(0.951)
-0.0066
(0.939)
Observations 349 349 349 351 351
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to the distance between 3 and 4. To come around this
problem, we replace the EDUCATION variable by
four dummy variables:
– ILLITERATE is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if the individual is illiterate and 0
otherwise;
– PRIMARY is a dummy variable taking the value
1 if the individual has finished primary education
and 0 otherwise;
– JSECONDARY is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if the individual has finished junior
secondary education and 0 otherwise; and
– SECONDARY is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if the individual has finished secondary
education and 0 otherwise.
Next, we re-estimate the complete model, including
three educational dummy variables.17 The results are
shown in column [2] of Table 2. The results are
comparable to those presented in column [1]. Again,
VFACCESS is negative and statistically significant.
Moreover, the variable JSECONDARY is significant
and positive, indicating that individuals having fin-
ished junior secondary education have a higher
probability of being a group leader. We interpret this
as evidence that higher levels of education are
associated with someone becoming the leader. The
other educational dummy variables are not statistically
significant. The variable TRADER is also statistically
significant and has a negative sign, indicating that
being a trader reduces the probability that a person is
the group leader. Finally, the variable MOSLEM is
positive and significant, meaning that individuals who
are Moslem have a higher probability of being a group
leader. As was discussed in Sect. 9.3 we have no
explanation for why there may be a positive associ-
ation between being a Moslem and being a group
leader. The other variables in the model are not
statistically significant, although again the variable
INCOME is relatively close to being significant.
The comment with respect to the interpretation of
the variable EDUCATION may also apply to the
variable VFACCESS. Again, we use an ordinal scale
running from 1 to 4. When analyzing the distribution
of the four values that VFACCESS can take, it turns
out that the majority of the observations take the
value 1 or 2. Whereas in 240 cases the value of
Table 2 continued
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Pseudo R-squared 0.0471 0.0620 0.0657 0.0483 0.0441
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively
The values reported in the table are the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. P-values appear
between parentheses. The dependent variable is LEADER. This is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 in case a group member is
the leader and the value 0 if otherwise. VFACCESS is a variable that indicates the value a group member attaches to having access to
loans from the credit program in the future and takes values ranging from 1 (=very high value) to 4 (=very low value); VFACCESS01
takes the value 0 if VFACCESS is 1 and the value 1 if VFACCESS is 2, 3 or 4; AGE is the age of the group member (in years);
EDUCATION measures the educational background of the group member, ranging from 1 (=illiterate) to 4 (=has finished secondary
education); ILLITERATE is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is illiterate and 0 otherwise; PRIMARY is a
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual has finished primary education and 0 otherwise; JSECONDARY is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if the individual has finished junior secondary education and 0 otherwise; MARRIED is a dummy variable,
being 1 if the group member is married and 0 if he/she is not; MOSLEM is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group member is a
Moslem and 0 otherwise. INCOME is the monthly income of the group member in Nakfas (the national currency of Eritrea);
CREDIT is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the group member has had access to any other type of external finance (i.e., loans
from a commercial bank, moneylender, family or friends, or trade credit) and 0 if this is not the case; TRADER is a dummy variable,
being 1 if the group member’s main occupation is being a trader and 0 otherwise; FARMER is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group
member’s main occupation is being a farmer and 0 otherwise; BORN is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the group member
was born in the same area where the survey was held and 0 if this is not the case; KNOWACT is a dummy variable, being 1 if the
group member indicates he/she has information about the activities of the other group members related to the use of the loan and 0 if
he/she indicates he/she does not have this information; KNOWMEM is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group member indicates he/
she knew the other group members before the group was formed and 0 if he/she indicates this was not the case; KNOWSALES is a
dummy variable, being 1 if the group members indicates he/she knows the monthly sales of the other group members and 0 if this is
not the case; LIVE is the number of years the individual has lived in the area where he/she was interviewed; CHGROUP is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if the group member indicates he/she has ever been a member of another group and 0 if this is not the case
17 The variable SECONDARY has been left out of the
regression for reasons of singularity.
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VFACCESS is a 1 and in 91 cases it takes the value 2,
in only 15 cases does it take the value 3 and in only 5
cases does it take the value 4. Therefore, we decided
to create a new dummy variable (VFACCESS01),
which takes the value 0 if VFACCESS is 1 and the
value 1 if VFACCESS is 2, 3 or 4. Thus, we turn the
ordinal variable into a variable that distinguishes
between low and high levels of VFACCESS. With
this newly created dummy variable we re-estimated
the complete model. The results, shown in column
[3], reveal that the outcomes are once again similar to
those reported in columns [1] and [2]. The variable
VFACCESS01 is statistically significant and has the
expected sign. Thus, our main result is robust for
different specifications of the access variable. More-
over, JSECONDARY, MOSLEM, and TRADER
remain statistically significant and have the same
sign as in the previous model outcomes. The results
for the other variables are also in line with the ones
shown earlier.
Next, we delete all variables for which we do not
find statistically significant results. This leaves us
with a model that only includes four variables:
VFACCESS01, JSECONDARY, MOSLEM, and
TRADER. If we run this reduced model (column
[4]), the results show that the TRADER variable is no
longer significant. The final result of the analysis is
presented in column [5]. This model only contains
variables for which we find significant results, i.e.,
VFACCESS01, JSECONDARY, and MOSLEM.
Based on the model presented in column [5], the
conclusion we may draw is that, first of all, the
probability of someone being a group leader is related
to the value a group member attaches to having
access to loans from the credit program in the future.
This outcome is in line with the main message of our
theoretical model presented in the first part of this
paper. Moreover, higher levels of education, and
especially having finished junior secondary educa-
tion, is associated positively with being a group
leader, indicating that higher educated members have
more authority based upon their knowledge skills vis-
a`-vis the other members, making them better suited to
become the group leader. Finally, being a Moslem is
associated positively with being the leader. As we do
not have a clear explanation for this finding, future
research may focus on investigating what is behind
this relationship. All other control variables fail to be
statistically significant.
9.5 Robustness test
As a robustness test, we again analyze the relation-
ship between being a group leader and the value a
group member attaches to having access to loans
from the credit program in the future, taking into
account a potentially important personal characteris-
tic, i.e., gender. This variable was not taken into
account in the above analysis, since the groups in the
Eritrean microfinance programs can be one of the
three following types: all group members are men, all
members are women, or members can have mixed
gender (i.e., both men and women). The impact of
gender on the probability of someone being a group
leader can only be usefully studied for the mixed
groups; for the all-men and all-women groups, the
gender is determined by definition.
Therefore, as an additional control variable we
add the variable GENDER to the vector of personal
characteristics as specified in Eq. 1. GENDER is a
dummy variable, being 1 if the group member is a
male and 0 if the group member is a woman. We
hypothesize that GENDER may be positively related
to the probability of being the group leader. In the
context of the cultural setting of the Eritrean society,
which is still relatively traditional and patriarchal,
men may have a higher chance of becoming group
leader than women. Of the 111 groups, 47 consist of
both male and female members (i.e., are mixed
groups). In total, we have data for 167 individuals
being member of one of these mixed groups.
We run exactly the same regression models as
those presented in Table 2. The results are shown in
Table 3. The main result of these additional analyses
is that, first of all, the value of having access to future
loans is an important determinant of the probability
of someone being a group leader, which supports the
results we reported in Table 2. Secondly, gender is
also an important determinant of being a group
leader. In particular, since the variable GENDER is
significant and positive, being a male increases the
probability of someone being a group leader, which
confirms our hypothesis concerning the association
between gender and leadership.18 All other variables,
18 As one referee indicated, it would have been interesting to
further analyze the impact of gender on the probability of being
a group leader, for example by evaluating whether gender
works differently in male- versus female-dominated groups.
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Table 3 Estimation results of the determinants of being the group leader: the role of gender
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
VFACCESS -0.1173*
(0.056)
-0.1190*
(0.057)
VFACCESS01 -0.1663**
(0.025)
-0.1534**
(0.036)
-0.1589**
(0.030)
GENDER 0.1799*
(0.065)
0.1738*
(0.079)
0.1749*
(0.079)
0.1700**
(0.021)
0.1354*
(0.051)
AGE -0.0010
(0.857)
-0.0016
(0.779)
-0.0020
(0.728)
EDUCATION 0.0147
(0.749)
ILLITERATE 0.1292
(0.471)
0.1426
(0.429)
PRIMARY 0.0809
(0.606)
0.0916
(0.560)
JSECONDARY 0.2406
(0.149)
0.2577
(0.124)
MARRIED -0.0268
(0.767)
-0.0233
(0.797)
-0.0188
(0.836)
MOSLEM 0.0241
(0.844)
0.0302
(0.808)
0.0314
(0.801)
INCOME 0.0000
(0.432)
0.0000
(0.515)
0.0000
(0.490)
CREDIT 0.2584
(0.111)
0.2356
(0.150)
0.2423
(0.139)
TRADER -0.1234
(0.167)
-0.1420
(0.116)
-0.1456
(0.108)
FARMER -0.1845*
(0.083)
-0.1799*
(0.092)
-0.1898*
(0.069)
-0.1277
(0.171)
BORN 0.0540
(0.732)
0.0016
(0.992)
-0.0075
(0.963)
KNOWACT 0.1327
(0.256)
0.1333
(0.258)
0.1316
(0.262)
KNOWMEM 0.0435
(0.655)
0.0358
(0.710)
0.0298
(0.759)
KNOWSALES 0.0231
(0.874)
-0.0105
(0.943)
-0.0089
(0.952)
LIVE -0.0003
(0.948)
0.0007
(0.887)
0.0010
(0.839)
CHGROUP -0.0057
(0.965)
-0.0060
(0.965)
-0.0121
(0.929)
Observations 167 167 167 167 167
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including JSECONDARY and MOSLEM, are not
statistically significant for the subsample of individ-
uals who are members of mixed groups.19
10 Conclusions
This paper has studied strategic monitoring behavior
within a group lending setting, both for the case with
and without the presence of a group leader. We have
shown that in both cases the monitoring efforts of the
borrowers in the group differ from each other in
equilibrium, as a result of the asymmetry between
these borrowers. The entrepreneur with the project that
generates the highest future profits also puts in the
highest monitoring effort. However, the difference
between the effort levels of the two monitoring group
members (B and C) is not only due to the difference in
interest with respect to the continuation of the loan, but
is also caused by a free-riding effect. Given that in our
setting monitoring effort is a strategic substitute, one
borrower reduces her level of monitoring if the other
increases her monitoring effort.
This effect is also at play when we introduce a group
leader into the model. The individual who becomes the
group leader will supply more monitoring effort than
in the benchmark case, because of the reduced per-unit
monitoring costs. As a consequence, the nonleader
free-rides on the higher level of monitoring of the
leader and reduces her monitoring effort. We also
obtained that, in equilibrium, the total monitoring
costs of the leader are higher than in the benchmark
case, even if the per-unit costs are lower. Still, it can be
beneficial for the most profitable entrepreneur to
volunteer to be the group leader. The probability that
Table 3 continued
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Pseudo R-squared 0.0981 0.117 0.125 0.0560 0.0459
*, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively
The values reported in the table are the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. P-values appear
between parentheses. The dependent variable is LEADER. This is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 in case a group member is
the leader and the value 0 otherwise. VFACCESS is a variable that indicates the value a group member attaches to having access to
loans from the credit program in the future and takes values ranging from 1 (=very high value) to 4 (=very low value); VFACCESS01
takes the value 0 if VFACCESS is 1 and the value 1 if VFACCESS is 2, 3 or 4; GENDER is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group
member is a male and 0 if the group member is a woman; AGE is the age of the group member (in years); EDUCATION measures
the educational background of the group member, ranging from 1 (=illiterate) to 4 (=has finished secondary education);
ILLITERATE is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is illiterate and 0 otherwise; PRIMARY is a dummy variable
taking the value 1 if the individual has finished primary education and 0 otherwise; JSECONDARY is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 if the individual has finished junior secondary education and 0 otherwise; MARRIED is a dummy variable, being 1 if the
group member is married and 0 if he/she is not; MOSLEM is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group member is a Moslem and 0
otherwise. INCOME is the monthly income of the group member in Nakfas (the national currency of Eritrea); CREDIT is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if the group member has had access to any other type of external finance (i.e., loans from a commercial
bank, moneylender, family or friends, or trade credit) and 0 if this is not the case; TRADER is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group
member’s main occupation is being a trader and 0 otherwise; FARMER is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group member’s main
occupation is being a farmer and 0 otherwise; BORN is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the group member was born in the
same area where the survey was held and 0 if this is not the case; KNOWACT is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group member
indicates he/she has information about the activities of the other group members related to the use of the loan and 0 if he/she indicates
he/she does not have this information; KNOWMEM is a dummy variable, being 1 if the group member indicates he/she knew the
other group members before the group was formed and 0 if he/she indicates this was not the case; KNOWSALES is a dummy
variable, being 1 if the group members indicates he/she knows the monthly sales of the other group members and 0 if this is not the
case; LIVE is the number of years the individual has lived in the area where he/she was interviewed; CHGROUP is a dummy variable
taking the value 1 if the group member indicates he/she has ever been a member of another group and 0 if this is not the case
Footnote 18 continued
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to test this. As
explained in Sect. 9.2, we have information for the group
leader and one or more other group members, meaning that we
do not have information for all members in a group. This does
not allow us to determine whether a mixed group is male or
female dominated.
19 Admittedly, comparison of the results in Table 2 with those
presented in Table 3 is somewhat difficult, because the results
presented in Table 3 are based on a subsample of the data we
have used to obtain the results presented in Table 2. This may
explain why we find different results regarding the control
variables in the two tables. Most importantly, however, the
results regarding VFACCESS and VFACCESS01 remain
unchanged in both sets of analyses.
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the least profitable borrower is monitored effectively
in that case is higher than if another group member is
the leader. Therefore, if the most profitable group
member becomes the group leader, this maximizes the
probability that the least profitable borrower puts high
effort into her project. We point out that the results we
have found are consistent with the empirical findings
of Hermes et al. (2005). They conclude that, for the
case of Eritrea, a large part of total monitoring is put in
by the group leader.
We test our theoretical model using information
from a survey we did among 351 group members of 111
lending groups in Eritrea in 2000. The survey allows us
to investigate why an individual volunteers to become
group leader. In the survey we have information on
several characteristics of individual members such as
age, gender, education, religion, marital status, income,
primary activity, whether they have access to finance
other than microfinance, and whether they have
information about the other members of the group.
Moreover, we have information about the value a group
member attaches to having access to loans from the
credit program in the future. This last variable allows us
to empirically test the theoretical model. Individuals
attaching higher value to having access to future loans
from the program are expected to have projects that
generate high future profits and may therefore have
more incentives to repay group loans, thereby securing
future access to finance. This, in turn, provides
incentives to volunteer to become the group leader, as
this position provides additional means to increase the
probability of repayment of the group loan.
As explained in Sect. 9, the survey was carried out
only once, which means we have cross-sectional static
data (i.e., only data for one year). We acknowledge
that this may be a shortcoming of the empirical
analysis, since our aim is to analyze the dynamics of
the group formation process. This means that, in order
to qualify as a test of our theoretical model, we make
two important assumptions. First, the group leaders we
interviewed during the survey in 2000 were the same
persons who were selected as leader when the group in
which they participate was formed. Second, the
perceptions regarding future profits of projects did
not change since the group was formed.20
If we accept this shortcoming of the available data,
however, the results shown in Sect. 9 provide
supporting evidence for the outcomes of the theoret-
ical model. In particular, we find strong evidence that
the probability of someone being a group leader is
related to the value a group member attaches to
having access to loans from the credit program in the
future. This outcome is in line with the main message
of our theoretical model presented in the first part of
this paper. This main result is robust to different
specifications of the access variable.
The paper should be seen as a first attempt to model
strategic behavior in a group lending setting and, using
our basic framework, to explain the voluntary aspect of
group leadership. However, we are aware of the partial
equilibrium character of our model, which is the result
of the assumption that the two most profitable
entrepreneurs always put high effort into their projects.
Relaxing this assumption would result in a more
general equilibrium in which every individual moni-
tors but is also monitored herself. Moreover, the timing
of the model could be adjusted, so that borrowers do
not simultaneously decide on their monitoring effort.
Notice that this may in fact reflect reality, as nonlead-
ers might have a tendency to postpone the monitoring
of peers until after the leader has monitored. This
would make the group leader a Stackelberg leader in
monitoring, which alters monitoring incentives within
the group. Next, the entrepreneurs could be considered
as being risk averse instead of risk neutral, which
probably also changes the equilibrium levels of
monitoring in the lending group. Our first idea is that,
with risk-averse entrepreneurs, the total monitoring
effort will be higher, because individuals want to
minimize the risk that they lose future payoffs.
However, it is not clear how this result may be
influenced when there is a group leader. This needs to
be investigated further. We leave this and other
questions put forward above for future research.
20 In future work, we aim to analyze the dynamics of the group
formation process as described in the theoretical model by
Footnote 20 continued
using panel data, in which we actually know whether or not the
group leader has changed since the group was formed and
whether perceptions regarding future profits have remained
constant over time.
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